Self-incriminating evidence. That’s what brought Team Penske’s illegal use of push-to-pass to light during a race weekend, revealing a breach in IndyCar’s technical regulations and raising questions about the intricate electronics within these high-performance machines. The scandal unfolded in Long Beach, but its roots and implications run much deeper, forcing a critical examination of the systems that govern IndyCar racing, particularly the Engine Control Unit (ECU) and its role in the controversial push-to-pass (P2P) system.
To understand the gravity of the situation, it’s crucial to delve into the workings of IndyCar’s P2P system and the electronic components at its heart. The NTT IndyCar Series employs a remote wireless activation system to control push-to-pass, managed centrally from race control. Typically, P2P is enabled for the entirety of warmup sessions, allowing teams to fine-tune their race setups with all systems operational. This standard procedure ensures teams can practice race starts and maneuvers under realistic conditions.
The P2P system itself is designed to provide a temporary power boost, enhancing overtaking opportunities and strategic race dynamics. When activated by race control, a signal is sent to the cars, enabling a button on the steering wheel. Upon pressing this button, drivers gain a surge of approximately 50 additional horsepower from their turbocharged engines through increased revs and turbo boost. IndyCar sets a specific time limit for P2P usage during races, typically between 150 to 200 seconds, which drivers can strategically deploy throughout the event. Crucially, the system is intended to be deactivated during race starts and restarts to maintain fair racing conditions at the most critical moments of a race.
This on-off control mechanism mirrors Formula 1’s Drag Reduction System (DRS), also managed remotely and disabled during starts and restarts. Just as F1’s race control dictates DRS availability, IndyCar’s system is designed to ensure P2P is only active when and where intended, relying on precise electronic signaling and control.
The unraveling of Team Penske’s infraction began unexpectedly during a warmup session in Long Beach. Technical difficulties in race control during the first 10 minutes of a 30-minute warmup session diverted attention, and as a result, the P2P system was not activated at the session’s start as it should have been. While the majority of the 27-car field, representing nine out of ten teams, proceeded without P2P, telemetry data revealed a startling anomaly: the three Team Penske cars were registering P2P usage despite the system being deactivated for everyone else.
This discrepancy immediately raised red flags. IndyCar and other teams observed that Penske drivers were accumulating seconds of P2P use when it should have been impossible. While it remains uncertain whether all three Penske drivers – Josef Newgarden, Scott McLaughlin, and Will Power – successfully exploited this illegal P2P access, the data unequivocally pointed to Team Penske as the sole beneficiary of functioning P2P during a deactivated period.
This unexpected revelation in the warmup session served as “self-incriminating evidence,” prompting IndyCar to launch an immediate review of Team Penske’s engine data and recent P2P usage. The investigation quickly uncovered that Newgarden and McLaughlin had also deployed P2P during the inactive start/restart phases at the season-opening race in St. Petersburg. Consequently, Newgarden’s victory and McLaughlin’s third-place finish in St. Petersburg were nullified. Power, though not implicated in illegal P2P use, received a 10-point penalty.
Had it not been for the technical glitches in race control during the Long Beach warmup, Team Penske’s manipulation might have gone undetected, potentially allowing the illegal “anytime” P2P usage to continue throughout the Long Beach race and potentially beyond, mirroring the unfair advantage gained in St. Petersburg. While IndyCar hasn’t confirmed whether the prohibited P2P usage extended to the non-points $1 Million Challenge at The Thermal Club, the discoveries at St. Petersburg and Long Beach suggest a pattern of potentially continuous exploitation throughout the season.
In response to the findings, Team Penske president Tim Cindric attributed the unauthorized P2P capability to a software version error within the ECU. He stated, “Unfortunately, the push-to-pass software was not removed as it should have been, following recently completed hybrid testing in the Team Penske Indy cars.” This explanation suggests that software intended for hybrid testing, where P2P deployment rules might differ, was inadvertently left active in the team’s ECUs for championship races.
Josef Newgarden and Scott McLaughlin benefited from permanently-available push-to-pass at St Petersburg, and it was only a fluke technical glitch in race control at Long Beach that led to the exploit being detected. Michael Levitt/Motorsport Images
However, this “software error” explanation has been met with skepticism within the IndyCar paddock. According to multiple engine technicians, race engineers, and data engineers who spoke to RACER anonymously, the reality is more complex than a simple software oversight in the ECU. These experts point towards the Central Logger Unit (CLU) and the MyLaps timing and scoring transponder as the likely points of manipulation, rather than the ECU itself being the source of the “error.”
To understand this alternative theory, it’s essential to recognize the distinct roles of the ECU and CLU in IndyCar systems. Engine manufacturers like Chevrolet and Honda, along with IndyCar itself, primarily interact with the ECUs. Teams, on the other hand, primarily interface with the CLUs and MyLaps transponders. The ECU, or Engine Control Unit, is essentially the brain of the engine, managing critical parameters like fuel injection, ignition timing, and turbo boost. In modern racing, ECUs are sophisticated pieces of technology, often custom-designed for motorsport applications and capable of processing vast amounts of data in real-time. While the original article does not specify the exact type of ECU used in IndyCars, they are undoubtedly advanced electronic control units designed for high-performance, turbocharged engines and capable of complex control strategies, including managing the push-to-pass system. These ECUs are crucial for optimizing engine performance, reliability, and adherence to racing regulations.
IndyCar employs “app layers” to lock down ECUs before each race weekend. These layers consist of an IndyCar app layer and an engine manufacturer app layer, defining parameters that manufacturers can and cannot modify. Crucially, IndyCar locks out P2P functionality in the ECU during practice and qualifying sessions. Before warmup sessions and races, IndyCar provides Chevrolet and Honda with a specific file that unlocks P2P. Engine technicians from each manufacturer then upload this file to each of their respective ECUs. This file not only enables P2P but also configures parameters like boost levels, RPM increases, and the P2P time-use limit.
However, even with this file uploaded, the ECU does not activate P2P on its own. The final activation step comes from a signal sent by race control’s master P2P system. This signal, transmitted through beacons placed around the track as part of the timing and scoring infrastructure, reaches each car’s CLU/MyLaps transponder first, and then is relayed to the ECU. Only upon receiving this signal does the ECU enable the P2P buttons on the steering wheels. The same process, in reverse, deactivates P2P by sending a signal to disable the buttons. The CLU/MyLaps transponder acts as an intermediary in this communication chain and, significantly, is not locked down or directly controlled by IndyCar or engine manufacturers in the same way as the ECU.
While the CAN (Controller Area Network) signal used by IndyCar for P2P on/off commands is encoded and resistant to hacking, the CLU/MyLaps transponder presents a potential vulnerability. Experts suggest that Team Penske exploited this vulnerability, focusing their manipulation on the CLU/MyLaps system rather than directly altering the ECU software.
IndyCar’s own statement highlights the critical rule that was breached: “Rule 14.19.15. An indicator to enable Push to Pass will be sent via CAN communication from the timing and scoring beacon on board the Car to the team data logger. This signal must be passed on to the ECU unmodified and uninterrupted during all Road and Street Course Events.” The terms “unmodified and uninterrupted” strongly suggest that Team Penske’s method involved intercepting and manipulating IndyCar’s P2P on/off signals at the CLU/MyLaps level, preventing the “off” signal from reaching the ECU and potentially spoofing an “on” signal when none was sent by race control. This would explain how Penske cars had functioning P2P during the warmup session when the system was globally deactivated.
The breach appears to have taken place in an area of the electronics chain that is controlled by the teams rather than the manufacturer or series. Michael Levitt/Motorsport Images
Reinforcing this understanding of system access, Chevrolet emphasized that the CLU and MyLaps system falls under the teams’ domain, not the manufacturers’. A Chevrolet spokesperson stated, “The code that modifies the IndyCar push-to-pass MyLaps transponder signal resides on the CLU and is the responsibility of the team. Chevrolet has no input or responsibility for the software or operation of the CLU. The engine responds to the output of the CLU.” This statement further distances Chevrolet from the manipulation, underscoring that the CLU is the team’s area of control.
However, this does not fully absolve Chevrolet from potential oversight. Engine technicians routinely download ECU data after each session, meticulously analyzing engine performance, including parameters like boost and RPM. The illegal P2P usage would have manifested as premature spikes in boost and RPM in the Penske ECUs, along with records of P2P button activations when the system should have been inactive. This data, readily available to both Team Penske and Chevrolet, presented opportunities to detect and self-report the infraction, particularly after the St. Petersburg race. Furthermore, engine manufacturers often pool data from all their cars, making irregularities in Newgarden’s and McLaughlin’s data potentially discernible when compared to other Chevrolet-powered cars.
Beyond manufacturer oversight, IndyCar itself possesses multiple layers of data collection that should have detected the illegal P2P usage. The series collects CLU data from every team after sessions and races, which includes basic engine data. Live telemetry streaming from cars on track to race control provides real-time monitoring of critical parameters, including P2P usage. Onboard video footage also offers visual confirmation of driver inputs, such as P2P button presses. These comprehensive data streams, both live and post-session, should have provided ample opportunity to identify the anomaly before the Long Beach warmup incident. Adding to this, it’s understood that at least one team raised concerns about Penske’s potentially illegal P2P usage in 2023, even providing onboard video evidence for IndyCar to review, indicating prior awareness of potential issues.
Despite these missed opportunities for early detection, IndyCar President Jay Frye is commended for his decisive action once the evidence came to light. He penalized Team Penske without hesitation, demonstrating that even the most prominent team is subject to the same rules and scrutiny as any other entrant. This decisive action upholds the integrity of the sport.
Nevertheless, the incident highlights a systemic lapse in oversight, allowing a multi-event rule violation to persist undetected despite readily available data. Relying solely on the good faith of teams to adhere to regulations is clearly insufficient. The critical question now is the extent to which IndyCar will investigate Team Penske’s past data, scrutinizing years of information to determine if the illegal P2P practices predate the 2024 season.
This scandal casts a shadow over Roger Penske, Tim Cindric, Josef Newgarden, Scott McLaughlin, and the IndyCar series as a whole. The deliberate circumvention of P2P rules, involving multiple individuals with access to car data, cannot be dismissed as a simple oversight. In the aftermath, IndyCar has reportedly implemented a software patch to prevent future exploitation of the CLU/MyLaps system for P2P manipulation. While this measure aims to prevent recurrence, the broader question of the depth and duration of Team Penske’s infraction remains. For the sake of competitive integrity, a thorough and potentially retrospective investigation is essential to ensure fair play and restore trust in IndyCar racing. This incident serves as a stark reminder of the complexities of modern motorsport electronics and the constant vigilance required to maintain a level playing field.
